The Oversight Body That Could Prevent the Next Massacre

In the Agranat Commission report, written after the failures of the Yom Kippur War, it was recommended to establish an independent department to conduct “devil’s advocate” evaluations and provide alternative intelligence assessments to those produced by the Intelligence Directorate in the IDF. This recommendation led to the creation of the “Oversight Department” in Military Intelligence, intended to address the lack of systematic scrutiny of the intelligence consensus held by the leadership prior to the war.

Although the Oversight Department was established, over the years it has been significantly downsized, limiting its ability to effectively challenge intelligence discussions across various topics. This department has had to fulfill its role with limited personnel while operating under the direct authority of the head of Military Intelligence, a structure that inherently restricts its access to the broader intelligence community and policymakers.

The intelligence failure that preceded the October 7 massacre reignited the discussion about the dangers of a rigid intelligence consensus. In the days leading up to October 7, the prevailing assessment in Military Intelligence suggested that Hamas was deterred and had no intention of attacking Israel—an assumption that went unchallenged and left Israel’s defense establishment unprepared. Intellectual diversity and the ability to bypass hierarchical constraints in cases of genuine concern over intelligence errors are foundational to strong and effective intelligence. The Oversight Department was supposed to play a critical role in this framework, but history shows that it has not been implemented adequately.

As a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, participating in numerous discussions since the start of Operation Iron Swords, I have observed an almost complete dependence of the political echelon on the military echelon. This dependency hinders the ability of political leaders to form alternative security perspectives to those proposed by the defense establishment. The political echelon must have the tools to pose substantive and professional questions and to challenge the assessments and conclusions presented by the military echelon.

To achieve this, I propose the establishment of a new oversight body that would report directly to the Prime Minister. This body should be well-funded, enabling it to specialize in various areas, similar to the division of expertise within Military Intelligence. It should also have access to the intelligence materials from all organizations within the intelligence community. This independent status would allow the new oversight body to fulfill its purpose—conducting in-depth, unbiased reviews of prevailing perspectives within the intelligence and defense communities, much like other oversight entities established by law.

Additionally, the oversight body should be required to submit reports on all relevant topics to the Prime Minister before decisions are made and to provide regular updates to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. This would strengthen the committee’s ability to effectively oversee the defense establishment and its decision-making processes.

I hope such a body will illuminate blind spots, challenge prevailing assumptions within the intelligence community, and ultimately prevent future disasters.